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Summary 
International human rights law has been progressively expanding and filling 
the areas that have traditionally been subject to the political decision-making 
process of sovereign states. Some states, however, have resisted to this, for 
instance, by refusing to implement the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights. For the same reason, they are also considering the withdrawal 
from the European Convention on Human Rights. 
This research sheds light on the complexity of implications of the 
withdrawal and non-compliance. It analyses them with respect to the UK and 
Russia. Furthermore, it determines the impact of these measures on the 
protection of human rights on the global, domestic and regional levels. 
The findings show that, on the one hand, the withdrawal and non-
compliance can have significantly different impacts on the human rights 
protection. On the other hand, substantially disparate implications can stem 
from the same measures taken by various states. 
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1 Introduction 
International human rights law (IHRL) has been progressively filling the 
spaces that have traditionally been subject to the political decision-making 
process of sovereign states. As a consequence, human rights have narrowed 
the boundaries of ways the sovereign states can exercise their rights. These 
developments, however, do not take place without resistance. Some states 
have stood up against them. They have expressed the opposition differently. 
Upon assumption of power, the UK Prime Minister argued for 
withdrawal from the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, more commonly known as the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). Moreover, for over a decade, the UK has been 
defying the binding force of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
judgments by failing to comply with them. Similarly, the Russian government 
has clearly expressed their dissatisfaction with the Convention. They have 
amended their constitutional law to resist the Court judgments. In fact, in 
violation of international law, they have refused to enforce a few of the Court 
judgments.  
Such expressions of resistance affect the protection of human rights 
on different levels in particular globally, domestically and regionally. 
Nevertheless, the extent of impact on human rights cannot be generalized due 
to the complexity of the matter. It cannot be assumed that the same measure 
taken by different states will give rise to the same implications. Similarly, it 
is not certain what implications will stem from different measures taken by 
one state. 
Several studies in the field have investigated the relationship between 
sovereignty and human rights. Researchers have identified the role of IHRL 
and the extent to which it has limited sovereignty. Additionally, some studies 
have identified underlying reasons for the state discontent with human rights 
while others have focused on the possibility of overcoming the challenge of 
states’ resistance. However, little attention has been drawn to the complexity 
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of implications that the withdrawal from the Convention or the non-
compliance with the judgments can have. For this reason, this research will 
attempt to contribute to reducing this gap. 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
This research focuses on the specific measures that states can take in 
particular on the withdrawal from the Convention and non-compliance with 
the Court judgments. It intends to shed light on the complexity of their 
implications and to identify the factors that influence the impact on the 
protection of human rights on the global, domestic and regional levels. This 
study will attempt to address the following questions: 
• What are anticipated impacts of the withdrawal and non-compliance 
on the protection of human rights on the global, domestic and regional 
levels? 
• Do state characteristics affect the impact? If yes, how? 
• Is there an interplay on several dimensions between, on the one hand, 
the withdrawal and non-compliance and on the other hand, different 
characteristics of the member states to the Convention? 
1.2 Methodology 
This thesis is attempting to achieve its purpose using a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative research. It is mainly based on international and 
national laws, rulings and reports of international and national bodies and 
NGOs, other acts of governments, official statements of international 
organizations and governments as well as on the works of scholars and 
statistics. 
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The research, firstly, identifies the relationship between human rights 
and state sovereignty. Then, it describes a framework of the European human 
rights system, including ECHR and the rules of ECtHR. Afterward, the thesis 
analyses two states - the UK and Russia. Furthermore, in these states, the 
research identifies tendencies to withdraw from the Convention and refuse to 
comply with the Court. Subsequently, legality of the withdrawal and non-
compliance is determined under the applicable international law. Then, the 
research turns to the impact of the tendencies on the protection of human 
rights on the global, domestic and regional levels. Finally, through 
comparative analysis, conclusions are drawn. 
1.3 Delimitations 
There are multiple factors globally, regionally and domestically that threaten 
the protection of human rights. However, this research will only study the 
withdrawal of the member states from ECHR and the refusal by the member 
states to implement the judgments of ECtHR. Despite this limitation, the 
thesis will explore the global, domestic and regional implications of the 
withdrawal and non-compliance. 
There are 47 member states to ECHR. Due to size restrictions, 
however, this research will only focus on two member states in particular the 
United Kingdom and Russian Federation. This combination was chosen on 
the basis that these states have substantially different characteristics such as 
a reputation and a role in the Convention system. This, as a result, will allow 
the thesis to demonstrate the widest spectrum of possible implications of the 
withdrawal and non-compliance. Nevertheless, on the contrary, due to the 
limitation of the analysis to merely two states, the research may disregard an 
important factor that is not present with respect to the UK and Russia. 
Finally, it has to be noted that the research is based on legal and factual 
circumstances as of 15 May 2017. 
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1.4 Outline 
This thesis will attempt to answer the questions in 5 chapters - the first being 
the introduction. The second chapter will describe human rights, state 
sovereignty and the European human rights protection system. The third 
chapter will provide a country analysis. It will describe human rights 
situations in the UK and Russia in general as well as it will go into detail with 
respect to ECHR and identify the tendencies to withdraw from the 
Convention and refuse to implement the Court judgments. After that, the 
fourth chapter will elaborate on the country analysis. It will determine the 
legality of the withdrawal and non-compliance. Then, it will identify possible 
implications on the protection of human rights on the global, domestic and 
regional levels. Finally, the sixth chapter will outline findings of the research. 
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2 International Human Rights Law 
2.1 Human Rights and Sovereignty 
2.1.1 Human Rights 
Human rights are a set of principles that govern a vertical relationship of states 
and individuals. These principles are in place to protect individuals from more 
powerful, highly organized and resourceful states. Individuals have human 
rights, for instance, the right to life, freedom from torture, fair trial, liberty 
and security, private and family life, freedom of religion, freedom of 
expression and freedom from discrimination. States have corresponding 
positive and negative obligations to respect, protect and fulfil these rights. 
Human rights are said to be universal, inalienable, indivisible, 
interdependent and interrelated. Universality and inalienability refer to the 
fact that everyone possesses them without distinction of any kind such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.1 Human rights cannot be taken away. 
They are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated as they exist together, 
overlap and cannot be enjoyed separately.  
Human Rights are protected on international and domestic levels. 
However, main developments in the field take place on the international level. 
When changes happen on the international level they are mirrored by 
domestic legislations. Consequently, obligations of a number, if not the vast 
majority of states are affected. However, when a development in the field of 
human rights takes place on the domestic level usually it does not have a 
significant effect on the international obligations of the state. Even if the 
                                                 
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (217 A (III)) art 2. 
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change on the domestic level affects the international obligations of the state, 
mostly, it is exclusively limited to that state only and does not impact 
international human rights obligations of other states. 
The concept of human rights is not an invention of the 20th or 21st 
century. They have been prescribed in such old documents as the 13th century 
Magna Carta, a charter agreed to by King John of England. However, the 
beginning of IHRL, as we know it now, started after the World War II.  
IHRL constitutes a part of public international law. For this reason, 
sources of the former and the latter are the same.2 These are: 
(a) international conventions; 
(b) international custom; 
(c) general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) judicial decision and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations.3 
International conventions are primary sources of IHRL today.4 
Universal and regional human rights systems, including instruments and their 
monitoring bodies, are established by international and regional treaties. 
However, despite the fact that almost all the rules of IHRL are regulated by 
treaties, international customary law remains important.5 This is because 
unlike the treaty obligations, the rules of customary law are binding for every 
state with no regard to its consent or membership to a treaty.6 Accordingly, it 
is an obligation of all states to fulfil the requirements of a human rights norm 
of customary law. General principles of law, judicial decisions and writings 
                                                 
2 Daniel Moeckli and others (eds), International Human Rights Law (Second Edition, 
Oxford University Press 2013) 75. 
3 Statute of the International Court of Justice 1946 art 38 (1). 
4 Moeckli and others (n 2) 77. 
5 ibid 83. 
6 Except a persistent objector. 
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of jurists are used as subsidiary sources.  They come into effect only when a 
legal issue cannot be resolved by a treaty or a customary norm. 
Stephen Hopgood in his book The Endtimes of Human Rights 
distinguishes two forms of human rights.7 He calls them “human rights” and 
“Human Rights.” The former, according to Hopgood, is a domestic and 
transnational activism that sheds light on existing abuses. It demands 
measures to be taken by governments and the United Nations (UN). It is 
rooted in the common understanding and demand for fairness and equality. 
Hopgood claims that the “human rights” do not and will never have endtimes.  
The latter, on the other hand, according to him, represents human 
rights frameworks and organization under international law. It consists of 
own legislations as well as legislative and judicial bodies. They speak in the 
name of humanity as a whole and require that all adhere to the norms that are 
based on the universality and secular moral authority. The moral authority in 
the past has been of impartial nature, neutral and apolitical. However, these 
characteristics rendered the activism to be weak and ineffective against 
powerful abusers. In order to provide human rights with a more powerful 
platform, states have been placed in the centre of human rights protection. As 
a result, according to Hopgood, a major trait of the moral authority - the lack 
of self-interest was compromised. Due to the fact that the state powers got 
involved in advancing and protecting human rights, “Human Rights” became 
a platform where certain conceptions of society were promoted. 
Consequently, the human rights regime suffered the loss of legitimacy.8 
It has to be taken into account that states enjoy sovereignty. Hopgood 
notes that “when the sovereign changes its mind and declares itself and its 
clients exempt from its own rules” the “Human Rights” will be even weaker 
than before, it will be left without the moral authority. Unfortunately, 
according to Hopgood, in the face of diminishing power of moral norms, it is 
                                                 
7 Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Cornell University Press 2013) VIII–
IX. 
8 ibid VII–XV. 
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not sufficient to name and shame governments. As a result, “[s]overeignty 
will be reaffirmed, global markets will be extended, and some forms of 
transnational culture will grow, but global liberal norms will stagnate and 
even contract in terms of meaningful impact on the daily lives of ordinary 
people.”9 
2.1.2 State Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is an exclusive feature of states. It’s only the states that have 
sovereignty and no other entity can exercise it. Hélène Ruiz Fabri notes that, 
in line with a traditional approach, the meaning of sovereignty is different on 
domestic and international levels. In the domestic legal setting, the term refers 
to a supreme power or authority that is often described as absolute or 
unlimited. However, from the international law perspective, sovereignty is 
not descriptive of the characteristic of having power, but of freedom - 
sovereign states are free to exercise their powers as they desire. It implies to 
the fact that a state is not subject to the oversight and control of a higher 
authority nor to the obligations that the state has not consented to. However, 
this does not mean that states have unlimited supreme powers. For this reason, 
according to Ruiz Fabri, the definition of state sovereignty under international 
law is more realistic.10 
Sovereignty in international law takes into account the coexistence of 
multiple states on the basis of sovereign equality.11 In fact, the notion of 
sovereign equality and sovereignty are complementary. The latter provides 
that every sovereign state has the same rights and legal capacity as any other 
sovereign state. One particular state, however sovereign, cannot make 
                                                 
9 ibid XIII. 
10 Hélène Ruiz Fabri, ‘Human Rights and State Sovereignty: Have the Boundaries Been 
Significantly Redrawn?’ in Philip Alston and Euan Macdonald (eds), Human Rights, 
Intervention and the Use of Force, vol The collected courses of the Academy of European 
Law (Oxford University Press 2008). 
11 ibid. 
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decisions on behalf of others due to the fact that every sovereign state is 
entitled to make its own decisions. Hence, the sovereignty of one state is 
limited by the sovereignty of other states. In other words, the sovereignty of 
one state ends where the other’s start. 
In addition to this, the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of a sovereign state derives from state sovereignty. It is enshrined in 
the United Nations Charter: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”12 Moreover, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) confirmed that the principle of non-
interference is a norm of international customary law. ICJ, in the case of 
Nicaragua v the United States, interpreted the UN Charter provision as 
follows: 
the principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly 
or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A 
prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters 
in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, 
to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, 
social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy.13 
One of the main aspects of state sovereignty is the capacity to 
conclude international treaties that confer rights and obligations on the 
concluding state itself.14 This is enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT) - “Every State possesses capacity to conclude 
treaties.”15 However, in line with the abovementioned principles of 
international law, article 34 of VCLT establishes that “a treaty does not create 
                                                 
12 Charter of the United Nations 1945 (1 UNTS XVI) art 2(7). 
13 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States of America) (1986) 1986 ICJ Rep (International Court of Justice) [205]. 
14 Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2011) 107. 
15 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 art 6. 
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either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.” It has to be 
noted that the state consent may be invalidated if it has been expressed based 
on error, fraud, corruption or coercion.16 
Accordingly, states themselves legislate rules of international law 
which, after they enter into force, will apply only to those who consented to 
be bound by them. For instance, the application of universal human rights 
treaties has been consented by the vast majority of sovereign states - 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) with 169 state 
parties and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) with 165 state parties. Similarly, the vast majority of 
European states - 47 - are parties to the regional European Convention on 
Human Rights. Consequently, in accordance with the principle of state 
sovereignty, states that have yet to become parties to these treaties are not 
directly bound by them. 
2.1.3 Human Rights vs. State Sovereignty 
Whereas state sovereignty is about freedom, IHRL places limitations on states 
through the imposition of obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human 
rights. Ruiz Fabri has suggested that the boundaries between state sovereignty 
and human rights have been redrawn.17 Additionally, Noel Malcolm holds a 
similar opinion that the human rights law has substantially eroded the 
unlimited breadth of politics.18 
Ruiz Fabri argues that state sovereignty has been restricted voluntarily 
as well as non-voluntarily. Firstly, she notes the existence of voluntary 
limitations. These are international human rights commitments that states 
have consented to be bound by, for instance, by entering into a human rights 
                                                 
16 ibid art 48-52. 
17 Ruiz Fabri (n 10). 
18 Noel Malcolm, ‘Human Rights Law & the Erosion of Politics’ (2016) 34 The New 
Criterion <http://www.newcriterion.com/articles.cfm/Human-rights-law---the-erosion-of-
politics-8306> accessed 16 May 2017. 
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treaty. According to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
treaties that establish obligations do indeed restrict the exercise of the 
sovereign rights of the state. However, PCIJ emphasized that a state’s consent 
to be bound by a treaty is not “an abandonment of its sovereignty.” In fact, 
“the right of entering into international engagements is an attribute of State 
sovereignty” itself.19 
In addition to treaties, Ruiz Fabri considers the rules of customary law 
to be voluntary limitations.20 The author of the research believes that 
international customs can, in specific circumstances, be voluntary. However, 
due to the fact that the creation of customary norm does not require a valid 
consent from any particular state, mostly, it is hard to consider them to be 
completely voluntary. 
Secondly, Ruiz Fabri categorizes some of the limitations as non-
voluntary. According to her, these limitations are placed on states in the name 
of human rights through coercion or other means. For example, the imposition 
of economic embargos on particular states to urge them to obey the rules of 
human rights. Similarly, UN Security Council (UNSC) takes measures 
against the breaches of “international peace and security,” including grave 
violations of human rights.21 ICJ in the case of Barcelona Traction 
established that ‘the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the 
human person’ give rise to erga omnes obligations. These are the obligations 
that a state has ‘towards the international community as a whole’ and ‘all 
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection.’ States, in 
accordance with international law, enjoy the ‘rights of protection’ with 
respect to erga omnes obligations.22  
                                                 
19 SS ‘Wimbledon’ (United Kingdom, France, Italy & Japan v Germany) [1923] Permanent 
Court of International Justice III.I., No. 1 Ser A 25. 
20 Ruiz Fabri (n 10) 47. 
21 Ruiz Fabri (n 10). 
22 Barcelona Traction (Belgium v Spain) 1970 ICJ Rep (International Court of Justice) [33–
34]. 
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Lastly, Ruiz Fabri distinguishes the third category of limitations that 
she calls the “element of irrecusability.”23 There, she allocates the limitations 
that do not fall within the voluntary or involuntary limitations. Examples of 
irrecusable limitations are human rights conditionality clauses in aid 
agreements and conditioning the recognition of emerging new states upon the 
fulfilment of certain requirements related to human rights. The final example 
of this category is the unforeseeability of the future developments of human 
rights instruments.24 For instance, the negotiating states in the drafting 
process of the European Convention on Human Rights could not foresee the 
manner in which the instrument would develop in the future. We will return 
to this issue later in this chapter. 
2.2 European Human Rights System 
2.2.1 Universal and Regional Systems 
Non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 is a foundation of the universal 
system of human rights. Later in 1966, the General Assembly, on the basis of 
UDHR, adopted two covenants. Rights listed in UDHR were categorized into 
two groups, namely, the first generation and the second generation of human 
rights. The covenant that enshrined the former was named, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the latter was included in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Nowadays, 
the three documents in particular UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR are referred to 
as the International Bill of Human Rights. 
                                                 
23 Ruiz Fabri (n 10) 50. 
24 Ruiz Fabri (n 10). 
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The International Bill of Human Rights has recognized the protected 
human rights and made it binding for its state parties to respect, protect and 
fulfil them. Moreover, the implementation of the covenants by the state 
parties is monitored by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Other than the universal human rights system, there are regional 
human rights systems that monitor, promote and protect human rights in 
specific regions of the world. These regional human rights systems have been 
established within frameworks of regional intergovernmental organizations. 
These are the Council of Europe (CoE),25 Organization of American States 
and African Union. They have adopted human rights instruments that 
constitute the foundations of the regional human rights systems. The 
Organization of American States adopted the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man (1948) and the American Convention on Human 
Rights (1969) as well as their monitoring bodies the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The 
African Union adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(1981), also known as the Banjul Charter, with monitoring bodies, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. It has to be noted that there are other regional 
organizations in Europe, Americas and Africa that are operating in the field 
of human rights. However, the former organizations remain the backbones of 
the regional systems. In addition to these regions, there are developments in 
the field of human rights in the countries of the Middle East and Southeast 
Asia within the frameworks of the League of Arab States and the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, respectively. 
                                                 
25 The CoE system will be discussed in the upcoming part. 
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2.2.2 Overview of the CoE System 
The Council of Europe, founded in Strasburg in 1949, initially, was a 
distinctively western organization. Its aim has been to “achieve a greater unity 
between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals 
and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their 
economic and social progress.”26 Importance and the influence of the 
organization have been boosted through its activities in the field of human 
rights. Article 3 of the statute of CoE makes it mandatory for every member 
state to “accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all 
persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”27 
Since 1990 the organization has expanded its membership throughout the 
entire continent - at the moment of writing this thesis, CoE has 47 member 
states. 
The key institutions of the organization are the Committee of 
Ministers (CM), Parliamentary Assembly, Secretariat, European 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Congress of Regional and Local 
Authorities, Conference of International Non-Governmental Organizations, 
and finally, the European Court of Human Rights. These institutions carry out 
the entire spectrum of functions of the organization. 
The Council of Europe, since its establishment, has adopted over 220 
treaties on a wide range of issues.28 Among these, some of the important 
achievements are the adoption of the European Social Charter (1961, revised 
in 1996), the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987) and the European Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995). However, above 
all, the European Convention on Human Rights is considered to be the main 
achievement of the organization. 
                                                 
26 Statute of the Council of Europe 1949 art 1(a). 
27 ibid art 3. 
28 ‘Complete List of the Council of Europe’s Treaties’ (16 May 2017) 
<http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list> accessed 16 May 2017. 
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2.2.3 European Convention on Human Rights 
The European Convention on Human Rights was drafted in 1950 and entered 
into force on 3 September 1953. It was intended to provide an independent 
judicial mechanism for the collective enforcement of human rights.29 The 
Convention with its accompanying court has for many decades been a highly 
celebrated achievement in the field of human rights. It has redressed a 
countless number of human rights violations in its member states.  
Since its adoption, the Convention has been amended for a number of 
times. As of now, the Convention consists of three sections. Section I 
concerns the rights and freedoms protected under the Convention. Section II 
regulates the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights and its 
rules of operation. Finally, Section III includes various concluding provisions. 
Additionally, several protocols enshrine rights and freedoms that are not 
included in Section I of the Convention. For example, the Protocol 1 
supplement the protection of property, the right to education and the right to 
free elections to the list of rights over which the Court has jurisdiction. 
However, here it needs to be noted that the protocols to the Convention do 
not automatically have a legally binding force on the member states to the 
Convention. Each protocol becomes legally binding only for those particular 
states that have ratified it. 
2.2.4 Rules of the Court 
The Convention allows inter-state as well as individual applications. For 
inter-state cases, any party to the Convention may lodge an application 
against another party to the Convention alleging a breach of the provisions of 
the Convention and the protocols thereto.30 Nevertheless, inter-state cases are 
                                                 
29 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 
preamble. 
30 ibid art 33. 
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very rare before the Court. Since 2000, there has only been a number of 
applications lodged by Georgia and Ukraine against Russian Federation.31 
Moreover, the Convention grants the Court the capacity to “receive 
applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High 
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols 
thereto.”32 In fact, the vast majority of the cases originate from individual 
applications. The Court deals with a colossal number of individual 
applications. At times, the number of pending cases before the Court has 
exceeded hundred thousand. 
The application process of the Court has been reformed for a number 
of occasions. As of now, the Court rulings are delivered by different 
formations of the Court in particular single-judge formation, three-judge 
committee, seven-judge Chamber and 17-judge Grand Chamber.33 The Court 
has a jurisdiction to deliver a judgment on the merits of the case determining 
whether or not a member state has violated rights protected under the 
Convention and protocols thereto. If the Court finds a violation of the 
Convention rights, it may afford just satisfaction to the injured party.34 A final 
judgment of the Court has a binding force and member states must obey it.35 
They are transmitted to the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of 
execution.36 
                                                 
31 Council of Europe, ‘Inter-States Applications’ 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/InterStates_applications_ENG.pdf> accessed 16 May 
2017. 
32 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (n 29) art 34. 
33 ibid art 26. 
34 ibid art 41. 
35 ibid art 46(1). 
36 ibid art 46(2). 
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2.2.5 Living Instrument Doctrine 
The Court, when determining whether or not a violation of human rights has 
taken place, applies standards set by the Convention. Nevertheless, it is the 
Court that interprets the standards. In doing so, the Court incorporates recent 
human rights developments. This makes the Convention reflective of modern 
social change. Otherwise, the Convention that was drafted in 1950 would 
have indeed been outdated by over a half a century later. In this process, the 
Court uses the “living instrument” doctrine. This doctrine was established by 
the Court in the case of Tyrer v. The United Kingdom.37 In the case, the Court 
stated that “the Convention is a living instrument which [...] must be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.”38 The use of the doctrine 
in Tyrer v. The United Kingdom meant that birching as a corporal punishment 
was deemed to be causing humiliation that attained the level inherent in the 
notion of degrading punishment contrary to article 3 of the Convention.39 In 
the determination of the present-day conditions, the Court takes into account 
whether or not the conditions in question are “common” or “shared” amongst 
member states to the Convention. The Court also takes into account “any 
emerging consensus” with respect to the concerned human rights.40 On the 
other hand, a stance of the respondent state’s authorities on the issue at hand 
or public opinion in that state does not have a decisive power before the 
Court.41 
Living instrument doctrine has had a significant impact on the Court’s 
interpretation of the Convention rights. Besides the case of Tyrer v. The 
United Kingdom, there have been developments in the Court’s interpretation 
of almost all the Convention rights. These include the evolutive interpretation 
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of death penalty,42 prohibition of torture,43 prohibition of slavery and forced 
labour,44 right to a fair trial,45 right to family life,46 right to private life,47 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion,48 freedom of expression,49 
freedom of assembly and association.50 
Here we pick up from where we left off under 2.1.3 part in this chapter 
- Human Rights vs. State Sovereignty. As noted, the state sovereignty and the 
principle of non-intervention imply that only the states themselves can decide 
what commitments they make in international law. They have indeed 
exercised their sovereignty when they voluntarily consented to be bound by 
the Convention. Accordingly, the states have agreed to the list of rights and 
freedoms that would be included in the Convention as well as the scope of 
these rights and freedoms. Moreover, they have consented that the Court 
would fulfil the role of a monitoring body. Consequently, the Court is allowed 
to interpret the provisions of the Convention and apply them to the cases that 
are brought before it.  
As a result, the Convention system received “a certain degree of 
autonomy from the will of their creators.”51 Since its establishment, the 
Convention system has developed in a manner that the creators could not 
foresee at the time of drafting and adoption of the Convention. The 
autonomous widening of the scope of the Convention rights has further 
restricted the sovereignty of the member states. However, the member states 
have not provided an additional consent for the new restrictions. For this 
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reason, the Convention system is an example of the irrecusable limitations 
that, according to Ruiz Fabri, has redrawn the boundaries between human 
rights and state sovereignty.52 
Nevertheless, the partial autonomy of the Convention system does not 
entail an unlimited power of the Court. The latter still remains restricted by 
the provision of the Convention and the rules of international law. The Court 
has itself emphasized that the living nature of the Convention does not grant 
the Court the capacity to adopt a new right that is not included in the 
Convention or to ignore an existing Convention right. According to the Court, 
it neither can establish an exception or justification that is not recognized by 
the Convention.53 
Despite the fact that the Court has itself emphasized its own 
limitations under the international law and the Convention, it is often 
criticized for crossing this boundary. The Court is frequently called out to be 
legislating where it deems to be necessary. For instance, Lord Hoffmann, a 
former senior British judge, while agreeing that the Convention must be an 
evolutive instrument, criticizes the use of the doctrine of living instrument. 
He states that the “proposition that the Convention is a ‘living instrument’ is 
the banner under which the Strasbourg court has assumed power to legislate 
what they consider to be required by ‘European public order.’”  He supports 
his criticism with an example of a judgment of the Court in which it is 
attempted to recognize a concept of “protection of environmental human 
rights”54 under the Convention that does not prescribe such a concept.55 
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2.2.6 Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
Additionally, there is another doctrine used by the Court - margin of 
appreciation - that, in a broader context, is related to the living instrument 
doctrine and most importantly, to this research. Current 47 member states of 
the Convention have different political, economic, social and cultural 
backgrounds. Because of this, the member states have individual approaches 
to some of the human rights issues. However, provided that only one 
convention is to be applied to all of its member states, such individual 
approaches create challenges for the Court. To overcome them, the Court 
resorted to the doctrine of margin of appreciation. 
According to this doctrine, the Court, in certain circumstances, may 
deem the domestic authorities to be “in a better position,” compared to the 
judges of the Court, to determine whether the concerned state is in compliance 
with the requirements of the Convention.56 Granting member states the 
margin of appreciation entails the states having discretionary power to decide 
on the respective issues. Still, where a state has been granted a margin of 
appreciation, its decisions are subject to the supervision of the Court. This 
happens as a consequence of the fact that the system of human rights 
protection established by ECHR is “subsidiary” to the domestic human rights 
systems. Primarily, the member states are in charge of protecting the 
Convention rights. And, the Court has a jurisdiction to deal with a human 
rights matter only after all domestic remedies are exhausted with respect to 
the latter.57  
When the Court is determining whether or not a member state has 
acted in compliance with the requirements of the Convention, it takes into 
account the width of the margin of appreciation granted to the state.58 The 
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wider the margin is, the more discretionary power the state enjoys. The Court 
decides on the width of the margin using three criteria. Firstly, the more 
“important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake,” the more 
limited is the margin. Secondly, the margin increases in situations where a 
state is required to strike a balance between competing interests. Lastly, the 
Court assesses the existence of consensus among the member states. Where 
the Court is unable to establish a consensus on an issue, the margin with 
respect to that issue widens.59 
The doctrine of margin of appreciation is praised and criticized at the 
same time. For instance, a former judge of the Court Ronald St. John 
Macdonald called the doctrine “a useful tool in the eventual realization of a 
European-wide system of human rights protection, in which a uniform 
standard of protection is secured.” According to him, “[t]he margin of 
appreciation gives the flexibility needed to avoid damaging confrontations 
between the Court and Contracting States over their respective spheres of 
authority.”60 Nevertheless, in the same work, Macdonald criticized the 
inconsistent application of the doctrine by the Court.61 
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3 Country Analysis 
3.1 United Kingdom 
3.1.1 UK and Human Rights 
Historically, the UK has consistently played a central role in the human rights 
friendly development within the Convention as well as throughout the world. 
As a matter of fact, UK has been one of the initial birthplaces of human rights 
and has, since then, stood up against human rights abuses in the world. As an 
individual state and a permanent member of UNSC, the UK has led 
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions and encouraged and pressured 
abusive governments to respect human rights. 
 Because of its consistent support for human rights, according to the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe Thorbjørn Jagland, the UK has a 
position of “the best pupil in class.” This gives the UK a lead over other 
“pupils” (states). In this position, it can help human rights as well as devastate 
them. For instance, when it ratifies a new human rights instrument or 
recognizes a new right, the UK has the power and credibility to pressure other 
states to do the same. Unfortunately, at the same time, if the UK takes a 
measure that denounces human rights or delegitimizes a human rights 
instrument, according to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights Nils Muižnieks, other states might “follow the UK’s lead” and do the 
same or similar.62 Other states “will say, ‘If the United Kingdom is doing that, 
we can also do it’”63 For this reason, the acts of the UK are directly related to 
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the human rights developments. This UK’s position grants it the influence 
and power over human rights and because of this, the UK has an additional 
responsibility as well.64 
3.1.2 UK and ECHR 
The UK was the first state in depositing the instrument of ratification of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in 1951. Moreover, it has made one 
of the major contributions to the drafting process of the Convention. 
Additionally, in 1998, the UK passed Human Rights Act with overwhelming 
cross-party support. This UK law incorporates Convention rights into 
domestic legislation, allowing victims of violations to claim their rights 
before the UK’s domestic courts. 
The Convention and the Court have made a significant contribution to 
the protection of human rights in the UK, including the protection of gender 
equality, LGBT rights, freedom of speech and of the press, presumption of 
innocence, right to a fair trial and the prohibition of domestic violence, 
corporal punishment, torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. For this 
reason, generally, the Convention and the values it contains have been greatly 
appreciated by the British governments for decades.  
Nevertheless, during the last decade, attitudes towards the 
Convention, Court and Human Rights Act have changed. Recently, British 
politics have been overwhelmed by sceptical rhetoric towards the CoE 
system. British state officials have often spoken against it. British 
Conservative politicians have accused judges at the European Court of 
Human Rights of engaging in “mission creep” - slowly increasing the scope 
of Convention rights. Their argument is that the UK has not originally agreed 
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to the contemporary interpretation of the Convention rights.65 They criticize 
the fact that the Convention is a ‘living instrument,’ which means that the 
rights enshrined in the Convention have to “be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions” in order to prevent the system from becoming 
outdated.66 
A former senior British judge Lord Hoffmann has been quite vocal 
about his critical attitude towards the Convention and the Court. In 2009, he 
wrote: 
The fact that the 10 original Member States of the Council of Europe 
subscribed to a statement of human rights in the same terms did not 
mean that they had agreed to uniformity of the application of those 
abstract rights in each of their countries, still less in the 47 States 
which now belong.67  
There, Hoffmann differentiates human rights “in abstraction” and “in 
application.” He argues that, on the one hand, human rights enshrined in 
ECHR are universal in abstraction. On the contrary, when it comes to the 
application of the Convention, the same human rights are national. Yet, 
according to him, ECtHR, in fact, provides the universal application of the 
abstract human rights. For this reason, Hoffman notes, the Court renders itself 
constitutionally illegitimate. To demonstrate the Court’s illegitimacy, he 
provides a scenario in which the balance between the freedom of the press 
and privacy in the UK is “decided by a Slovenian judge saying of a decision 
of the German Constitutional Court.”68 
The statements of the British politicians have been particularly critical 
of the CoE system. For example, in 2015, then Prime Minister David 
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Cameron said that he wants “British judges making decisions in British 
courts, and also the British Parliament being accountable to the British 
people.” Nevertheless, he did not explicitly suggest the withdrawal from 
ECHR, but ruled out “absolutely nothing” to achieve the abovementioned 
wish.69 However, the successor of David Cameron, Prime Minister Theresa 
May has been directly lobbying for the Britain’s withdrawal from ECHR.70 
Both Prime Ministers have often pointed towards possible causes of 
the sceptical attitudes. They have accused the Convention of compromising 
the national security and the public safety of the country. For example, 
Cameron mentioned the inability of the government to deport “these foreign 
criminals committing offence after offence […] because of their right to a 
family life.”71 May continued the same line of reasoning. She named several 
motivating factors for the withdrawal from the Convention. In particular, she 
mentioned the deportation and extradition proceedings of the suspected 
terrorists and the prisoners’ voting rights. She confirmed Cameron’s claim 
that ECHR makes the UK less secure by preventing the deportation of 
dangerous foreign nationals.72 
In fact, the UK has been involved in a number of legal battles before 
the European Court of Human Rights concerning the deportation and 
extradition. The loss of some of these cases has initiated strong criticism from 
the politicians and public.73 
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For instance, the case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United 
Kingdom, brought in 2009 before ECtHR, enraged public and politicians as it 
delayed the deportation of a suspected terrorist and the proceedings cost the 
UK taxpayers around two million British pounds.74 In the case, the Court 
assessed whether the deportation of a Jordanian national from the UK to 
Jordan would breach his rights under the Convention. After three-year-long 
proceedings, the Court unanimously found that the deportation would breach 
article 6. This was due to the fact that the applicant if deported risked that his 
trial in Jordan would not meet the requirements of the right to a fair trial under 
the Convention. Subsequently, the UK and Jordan ratified a treaty that 
provided guarantees and clarities that the requirements of the right to a fair 
trial would be met in Abu Qatada’s trial. After the ratification of the treaty in 
2013, Abu Qatada was deported to Jordan.75 
Another case that the UK politicians often mention concerns the 
extradition from the UK to the United States of a UK national suspected of 
terrorism. It was brought before the Court in 2008. Consequently, the UK was 
not permitted to extradite the applicant during the Court proceedings which 
lasted for 3 years. In the end, the Court found that the extradition would not 
breach human rights of the applicant under the Convention.76 
Moreover, article 8 of the Convention, the right to family life raises a 
highly publicized and politicized issue in the UK.77 Foreign offenders who 
are subject to deportation often claim that the deportation will violate their 
right to family life under the Convention. In fact, such claims have proven to 
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be effective in stopping deportations due to the fact that the UK judges often 
agree that the deportation will contradict with the requirements of the 
Convention. On this ground, UK immigration authorities are forced to halt 
the deportation proceedings and allow the persons in question to remain in 
the UK.  
There are a few ECtHR judgments against the UK that are particularly 
relevant to this research. These cases concern the prisoners’ right to vote. The 
UK imposes a blanket ban on the prisoners’ voting rights. Because of this, it 
has been involved in a long legal battle with its prisoners before the Court. 
In 2005, the Grand Chamber of ECtHR in the case of Hirst v United 
Kingdom (No. 2), with the majority of twelve votes to five, found the UK to 
be in violation of the right to free elections under article 3 of Protocol No. 1 
to the Convention, in denying all prisoners the right to vote. The Grand 
Chamber of the Court established that while the margin of appreciation in this 
area is wide, due to the “general, automatic and indiscriminate” nature of the 
restriction on a “vitally important” Convention right falls outside the margin, 
“however wide that margin might be.”78 
In spite of the 2005 Court judgment, the government of UK did not 
amend its legislation and refused to abolish the blanket ban on the prisoners’ 
voting rights. As a consequence, since 2005, over one thousand prisoners 
have resorted to the Court with similar claims that their right to free elections 
has been violated by the blanket ban. Subsequently, the Court found the UK 
to be in violation of the Convention in the cases of Greens and M.T. v. the 
United Kingdom,79 Firth and Others v. the United Kingdom,80 McHugh and 
Others v. the United Kingdom81 and Millbank and Others v. the United 
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Kingdom.82 CoE bodies, for over a decade, have been trying to persuade the 
UK government to halt these Convention violations. 
Yet, as of writing this thesis, UK has not implemented the judgments. 
Efforts of over thousand individuals, the Court and other bodies of CoE to put 
an end to these human rights violations have proven to be ineffective. UK 
government has not changed its stance and has persistently refused to do so. 
In fact, the UK politicians have been very vocal about their intentions. For 
instance, Cameron has said that it makes him “physically ill even to 
contemplate having to give the vote to anyone who is in prison.”83 Regardless 
of these attitudes, in 2010, UK government proposed a bill to bring the 
legislation in line with the Convention, but the members of the UK 
Parliament, by 234 to 22, voted overwhelmingly against the proposal.84 
3.2 Russian Federation 
3.2.1 Russian Federation and Human Rights 
The relationship of the Russian Federation and human rights has been quite 
the opposite of the UK’s. The Russian government has been becoming more 
and more repressive domestically and internationally. Human rights situation 
has substantially deteriorated in Russia as a result of narrowing fundamental 
rights and freedoms such as the freedom of expression, assembly, speech. 
Political freedoms are to the lowest as the imprisonment and assassination 
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rates of members of political oppositions are significantly high. LGBT groups 
are constantly oppressed under the Russian anti-LGBT “propaganda” law.85 
Russia in 2014 annexed the Ukrainian territory of Crimea.86 It also 
waged war against and invaded the Republic of Georgia in 2008.87 
Furthermore, the Russian government has consistently supported rebels on 
several territories outside Russia, including eastern Ukraine as well as 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia.88 Additionally, the Russian 
government is one of the key allies of the Syrian government. As a permanent 
member of UNSC, Russia has vetoed resolutions intended to halt the Syrian 
war and hold those responsible for the war crimes accountable.89 As a 
consequence, the Syrian civil war continues and causes more civilian deaths 
every day. These international acts of Russia have devastated human rights 
situation in the respective territories and destabilized states concerned.90 
As a result of having such a questionable human rights record, Russia 
is fairly antagonized. It does not possess the same human rights platform as 
does the UK. Nor do other states expect Russia to set an example. 
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3.2.2 Russian Federation and ECHR 
The Russian Federation ratified ECHR in 1998, including most of the optional 
protocols to the Convention. Since the ratification, Russia has been bound by 
the obligations enshrined in the Convention and its respective protocols.91 As 
a matter of fact, Russia has been among the few states that have the most 
applications brought against it. Furthermore, Russia is also among the states 
that are found by the Court in violation of the Convention and its protocols 
the most. During the period of 1959-2016, Russia, with 1834 judgments, was 
the second (after Turkey). In these cases, Russia has been found to be in 
violation of the entire spectrum of the Convention rights and freedoms such 
as the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, 
right to liberty and security, right to a fair trial, right to respect for private life, 
correspondence and family life, protection of property, right to education, 
prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens, prohibition of discrimination.92 
While the Court continuously finds Russia in violation of the 
Convention, criticism from the Russian government of the Court has been 
common. Russian politicians accuse the Court of fulfiling political 
functions,93 disregarding specificities of each state94 and contradicting with 
the principles of “one of the most democratic constitutions.”95 As part of this 
trend, President of Russia Vladimir Putin has said that the consideration of 
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the possibility of withdrawal from the Convention is on the agenda.96 In 
addition to the Russian politicians’ criticism, Russian judges in the European 
Court of Human Rights actively write dissenting opinions in the judgments 
of the Court where Russia is found to be in violation of the Convention and/or 
its protocols.  
The Russian opposition to the Court reached its culminating point 
when it passed a law allowing the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) to 
review acts of international human rights bodies.97 This law was adopted after 
RCC established that neither ECHR nor ECtHR prevailed over the 
constitution of Russia.98 The new law empowers the Constitutional Court to 
determine whether or not decisions and judgments of international human 
rights bodies, for instance, ECtHR, are in line with the Russian Constitution 
(RC). According to the new law, when a decision or a judgment contradicts 
with the RC, the Constitutional Court is entitled to declare the ruling non-
executable and refuse to implement it without any regard to the legal nature 
of the ruling, be it binding or not. 
Russia, similar to the UK, has been involved in a legal battle before 
the Court in connection with the prisoners’ voting rights. On 4 July 2013, 
ECtHR, in the case of Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia, found Russia to be 
in violation of the Convention in imposing a blanket ban on its prisoners to 
vote. The legal principles that the Court used in the judgment were the same 
as in the case of Hirst v. the United Kingdom (No. 2). The ban, according to 
the Court, “applied to all persons convicted and serving a custodial sentence, 
irrespective of the length of their sentence and irrespective of the nature or 
gravity of their offence and their individual circumstances.”99 Hence, it was 
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a general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction on the right to free 
elections which, as a matter of fact, contradicted with the Convention. 
Nevertheless, the Russian government tried to differentiate the present case 
from Hirst (No. 2) by emphasizing the fact that unlike in the UK’s legal 
system, prisoner’s voting rights in Russia were regulated by the Russian 
Constitution. However, the Court dismissed such claim, stating that the 
Convention does not distinguish constitutional provisions from the ones of 
the “ordinary” law. For these reasons, the Court found the violation of the 
right to free elections, article 3 of Protocol No. 1.100 
Nearly 3 years after the Anchugov and Gladkov judgment, in 2016, 
the Russian Constitutional Court delivered a ruling concerning the possibility 
of implementing the ECtHR judgment. The ruling was based on the new 
powers that RCC assumed by the 2015 constitutional law amendment. In the 
ruling, RCC argued that, firstly, the ban on the prisoners’ voting rights was 
explicitly imposed by article 32 of the Russian Constitution.101 Secondly, 
according to RC, its provisions prevail over international treaties, including 
the European Convention on Human Rights. Lastly, RCC determined that the 
article 32 of RC could not be interpreted as not being absolute. Moreover, it 
noted that Russia has never agreed to the interpretation of the Convention that 
the Court employed in the judgment. It stated that the change in the original 
interpretation of the Convention was done by the Court through the doctrine 
of living instrument. However, according to RCC, the doctrine shouldn’t have 
been used due to the lack of consensus among CoE member states. 
Subsequently, the Constitutional Court established that it was impossible to 
execute Anchugov and Gladkov judgment of the ECtHR.102 As a result, as of 
writing this thesis, Russia has not abolished the blanket ban on the prisoners’ 
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voting rights in compliance with the ECtHR judgment in Anchugov and 
Gladkov. 
Anchugov and Gladkov judgment is not the only ECtHR judgment that 
Russia has refused to comply with. On 31 July 2014, ECtHR, in the case of 
OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, delivered a judgment on just 
satisfaction. The latter judgment came subsequent to a judgment on merits in 
the same case. These judgments concerned the tax and enforcement 
proceedings brought by Russia against OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos, 
a Russian oil company, which led to its liquidation. In the case, the Court 
found Russia to be in violation of the Convention. Firstly, in giving an 
insufficient period of time to the applicant company for preparation of the 
case before the domestic courts, Russia had violated the procedural 
requirements of the right to a fair trial under article 6 of the Convention. 
Secondly, the imposition and calculation of penalties were carried out in 
violation of the protection of property under article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
Finally, the fast pace of the enforcement proceedings, the obligation to pay 
the full enforcement fee and the Russian authorities’ failure to take proper 
account of the consequences of their actions had violated the protection of 
property under article 1 of Protocol No. 1.103 As a consequence, the Court, in 
the judgment on just satisfaction, ordered the amount of € 1.87 billion to be 
paid in pecuniary damages to the applicant company’s shareholders.104 As a 
matter of fact, this is the largest sum of money that the Court has ever awarded 
to the victims of human rights violations. 
Despite the judgment on just satisfaction, Russia did not pay the award 
to the victims. On 19 January 2017, RCC delivered a similar ruling to the one 
concerning the case of Anchugov and Gladkov. Accordingly, it was delivered 
based on the 2015 constitutional amendments. The RCC ruling concerned the 
possibility of enforcement of ECtHR judgment on just satisfaction in the case 
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of OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos. The Constitutional Court stated that 
the damages that the applicant company suffered were the result of their 
illegal activities with respect to taxation. According to RCC, the company had 
resorted to unlawful schemes of evading taxes that had a negative effect on 
Russia’s economy. Due to these tax evasion schemes, the Russian state 
budget had been significantly underfinanced. It also emphasized that it is the 
same underfinanced budget that the ECtHR judgment ordered Russia to pay 
the award from. For these reasons, according to RCC, the enforcement of the 
ECtHR judgment will violate RC, namely, the constitutional principles of 
equality and fairness. Accordingly, on the basis of the 2015 constitutional 
amendments, RCC concluded that the Russian government is not bound by 
the obligation to pay the award of € 1.87 billion.105 In fact, as of writing this 
thesis, the Russian government has not implemented the OAO Neftyanaya 
Kompaniya Yukos judgment on just satisfaction. 
In addition to the withdrawal from the Convention and declaring 
particular ECtHR judgments to be non-executable, other developments have 
also been discussed with respect to Russia. Laurence R. Helfer has speculated 
that Russia may establish a “rival European human rights regime comprised 
of a few allies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics in central 
Asia.”106 He notes that this new framework could formally resemble the CoE 
system, in “reality, however, [it] would be much weaker.” According to him, 
in such circumstances, the Russian government would be able to use the new 
regime to produce competing rulings to the ECtHR judgments. Subsequently, 
it could “point to the competing decisions [...] to justify and legitimize 
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noncompliance with the Strasbourg Court’s judgments,” while, at the same 
time, remain a party to ECHR.107 
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4 Threats 
The previous chapter has analysed human rights situation in the UK and 
Russia. In particular, it focused on the tendencies in these member states to 
withdraw from the Convention and refuse the implementation of the 
judgments of the Court. This chapter, in the first place, will determine 
whether or not withdrawal from the Convention is legal under the applicable 
rules. Subsequently, it will analyse the global, domestic and regional 
implications of the withdrawal. After that, the next subchapter will determine 
the legality of non-compliance with the Court judgments under the applicable 
rules of international law. The last three parts will analyse the global, 
domestic and regional implications of the refusal to implement a judgment. 
4.1 Withdrawal from ECHR 
4.1.1 International Law and the Convention 
International law allows the withdrawal of a contracting state from an 
international treaty. According to article 54 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, which is a codification of a rule of customary law,108 “the 
withdrawal of a party [from a treaty] may take place: (a) In conformity with 
the provisions of the treaty; or (b) At any time by consent of all the parties 
after consultation with the other contracting States.” Some of the human 
rights treaties do not allow the withdrawal of parties to it. For instance, 
contracting states to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right 
may not withdraw from the Covenant. This is due to the fact that, as its 
monitoring body Human Rights Committee established, ICCPR “is not the 
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type of treaty which, by its nature, implies a right of denunciation.”109 
Nevertheless, there is a considerable number of human rights treaties that 
permit state parties’ withdrawal110 such as the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (2006) and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (1989). 
The European Convention on Human Rights, article 58, originally 
proposed by the UK in 1950,111 permits contracting parties to withdraw from 
the Convention through denunciation or ending membership to the Council 
of Europe. According to the Convention, a “High Contracting Party may 
denounce the present Convention only after the expiry of five years from the 
date on which it became a party to it and after six months’ notice.”112 Hence, 
the denunciation will take effect after the expiry of six months’ period from 
the submission of an advance notice. 
Additionally, any “High Contracting Party which shall cease to be a 
member of the Council of Europe shall cease to be a Party to this Convention 
under the same conditions.”113 In accordance with the Statute of the Council 
of Europe, the withdrawal from CoE will take effect at the end of the next 
financial year.114 This implies that the withdrawal from CoE will have the 
effect of denunciation of the Convention at the end of the next financial year. 
Hence, despite the fact that the withdrawal from either CoE or the Convention 
will eventually have the same effect of denunciation of the Convention, the 
moment that the denunciation becomes effective is different. This is 
particularly important due to the fact that, in line with the Convention, the 
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state in question will not be released from its obligations under the 
Convention with respect to the acts which may have been performed before 
the date at which the denunciation became effective.115 
In practice, it is not common to invoke the article 58. It is more 
common for politicians of member states to consider the prospects of 
denunciation in the domestic and international politics. Since the adoption of 
the Convention, denunciation has taken place only once. In December 1969, 
Greece announced its decision to withdraw from CoE and submitted the six 
months’ advance notice to denounce the Convention. In such circumstances, 
on the basis of article 58 paragraph 3 of ECHR and article 7 of the Statute of 
CoE, Greece would simultaneously cease membership to CoE and the 
Convention at the end of the next financial year, particularly, on December 
31, 1970. Nevertheless, due to the fact that Greece had also submitted the six 
months’ advance notice to denounce the Convention, in accordance with the 
article 58 paragraph 1 of ECHR, Greece would be released from the 
Convention obligations after six months, in June 1970. For these reasons, 
while Greece ceased to be a member of CoE in December 1970, it was 
released from its obligations under the Convention 6 months earlier. 
As a consequence of withdrawal, individuals and other member states 
will not be able to lodge applications against the withdrawing state, except in 
connection with the acts which “may have been performed […] before the 
date at which the denunciation became effective.”116 For instance, after the 
denunciation of the Convention by Greece in 1970, the European 
Commission of Human Rights deemed itself competent to continue the 
consideration of an application against Greece beyond the moment the 
denunciation became effective. However, in this particular case, on the basis 
of consent from the applicant states and Greece, the application was struck 
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out of the list of cases in 1974.117 The abovementioned entails that if the UK 
and Russia were to withdraw from the Convention, they could still be held 
accountable for the acts performed before the denunciation becomes 
effective. 
In addition to this, the Convention imposes an obligation on a 
withdrawing state to remain bound by the judgments of the Court delivered 
in connection with the acts performed before the denunciation becomes 
effective.118 Accordingly, withdrawal from the Convention to nullify 
obligations arising from the Court judgments is not a viable option under the 
Convention. Thus, the UK and Russia, in case of withdrawal from the 
Convention, will still remain bound by the judgments of the Court with 
respect to the prisoners’ voting rights. Additionally, Russia will remain bound 
by the obligation to pay the award in compliance with the OAO Neftyanaya 
Kompaniya Yukos judgment. 
4.1.2 Global Implications 
The global implications of the withdrawal of a member state from the 
Convention depend on several factors. Perhaps the most important factor is 
the characteristics and the role of the withdrawing state in the field of human 
rights. Because of this, the impact of withdrawal can be drastically different 
depending on a particular withdrawing state.  
If we take the UK, for example, its long-standing positive relationship 
with human rights must be taken into account. Its leading role in the human 
rights field is crucial for this assessment. States around the globe expect the 
UK to set an example and show the direction of human rights developments. 
According to UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Juan Mendez, the UK’s 
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withdrawal be “a very bad example for the rest of the world.”119 Given this 
fact, its withdrawal will send a signal of sacrificing human rights. 
Additionally, the fact that the UK is one of the founder member states of the 
Convention will amplify the negative impact. This will knock the UK off the 
global podium of human rights leading developers. Furthermore, the pressure 
that the UK has placed on the governments worldwide to respect, protect and 
fulfil human rights will lose credibility and legitimacy. As a consequence, 
human rights improvements can stagnate or reverse in some parts of the 
world. 
The role of the UK as a permanent member of UNSC must be taken 
into consideration. This position gives the UK a stronger platform to influence 
the human rights protection all around the world. For this reason, Muižnieks 
emphasized that “the UK has additional responsibilities within the UN 
system.”120 For the effective achievement of the goals of UNSC, it is crucial 
for its members to have credibility. However, the UK’s withdrawal from the 
most successful human rights instrument will render it less credible and its 
commitment to the respect for human rights questioned. 
On the contrary to the UK’s withdrawal from the Convention, 
withdrawal of Russia will have a substantially different impact on the human 
rights protection on the global scale. This is due to the characteristics of the 
Russian Federation and the role that it plays in the human rights protection. 
Owing to its questionable human rights record, there are not many states that 
look up to Russia for setting an example in the field of human rights. Neither 
does Russia exercise pressure on other governments to fulfil the human rights 
obligations. Accordingly, it is not crucial that Russia maintains its current 
platform and credibility in promoting and encouraging human rights 
protection. For these reasons, Russia’s withdrawal from ECHR will have 
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substantially limited negative implications on the global scale compared to 
that of the UK. 
The same applies to Russia’s permanent membership of UNSC. 
Normally, the credibility and reputation of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council are particularly important.121 However, due to the existing 
antagonistic relationship between Russia and human rights, this factor is not 
essential for the global impact assessment of Russia’s withdrawal from 
ECHR. 
In conclusion, the withdrawal of member states from the Convention 
will have varying effects on the human rights protection on the global scale. 
For the global impact assessment, the main factors are role and reputation of 
a particular withdrawing member state in the field of human rights. 
Withdrawal of a leading human rights advocate and a founder state of the 
Convention in particular the UK will have a substantial negative impact on 
the protection of human rights on the global scale. In contrast, the withdrawal 
of a member state with a questionable human rights record in particular 
Russia will generate an insignificant impact. 
4.1.3 Domestic Implications 
Withdrawal of a member state from the Convention will have one of the 
largest impacts on the human rights protection domestically in that state. This 
is due to the fact that ECtHR will lose the jurisdiction to rule on the acts of 
the former member states that are performed after the denunciation takes 
effect. Accordingly, the victims of human rights violations committed by the 
former member states of the Convention will lose access to the Court. 
In theory, after the withdrawal, the victims of human rights violations 
can make use of the individual complaint mechanism under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. ICCPR, similar to ECHR, enshrines 
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civil and political rights and in some aspects, goes even beyond the 
Convention, for instance, in the protection of the rights of minorities.122 
Optional Protocol to ICCPR establishes the individual complaint mechanism 
that grants the Human Rights Committee the capacity to “receive and 
consider communications from individuals.”123 HRC adopts views on 
communications that it receives and determines whether or not the human 
rights enshrined in the Covenant have been violated. The Committee regards 
its views as “authoritative determinations” of the obligations under the 
Covenant. According to the Committee, state parties are required to comply 
with its views in order to fulfil their obligations under article 2 of ICCPR - 
effective remedy.124 
While HRC can determine whether or not a state has violated human 
rights under ICCPR, a few factors need to be accounted for. For instance, the 
HRC does not have the jurisdiction to receive communications against all of 
the ECHR member states. The individual complaint mechanism is optional 
for the state parties to the Covenant. As a result, while ICCPR has 169 parties 
to it, only 116 of them have also agreed to the mechanism.125 The UK, for 
instance, is a party to ICCPR. However, it has not agreed to the mechanism.  
Consequently, in the case of the UK’s withdrawal from ECHR, it will 
become up to its domestic judicial authorities to redress the human rights 
violations.126 In fact, in 2016, the Court has found the UK to be in violation 
of the Convention in seven judgments, compared to the average of about 18. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the UK’s judicial branch is redressing human 
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rights violations fairly well.127 Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the statistics, 
it is not perfect and accordingly, we can assume that the UK’s withdrawal 
from the Convention will have an adverse effect on the human rights 
protection in the UK.128 
Another factor to take into account is the capacity of HRC to consider 
a large number of communications. So far, it has adopted a small number of 
views. To put it in perspective, the full-time ECtHR, having jurisdiction over 
820 million individuals, in the year of 2016, delivered 989 judgments. Among 
these judgments, 228 of them were against Russia.129 On the contrary, the 
part-time HRC, having jurisdiction over 2.3 billion individuals,130 last year, 
adopted only 68 views.131 The latter number is 3.4 times less than the number 
of the ECtHR judgments against Russia. For this reason, the author of the 
research believes, HRC will not be able to handle the caseload originating 
from some of the member states of ECHR such as Russia. 
Accordingly, if Russia withdraws from the Convention, the Human 
Rights Committee will not have the ability to cope with the high number of 
human rights violations. Consequently, the Russian domestic judicial 
authorities will have the final say in the human rights cases.132 Unfortunately, 
the statistics of ECtHR clearly show that the Russian judiciary is unable to 
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redress human rights violations.133 Additionally, it has to be considered that 
the Court’s jurisdiction serves as a deterrent to the human rights violations. 
Hence, the withdrawal from the Convention will abolish the deterrent effect, 
resulting in more human rights violations without redressing them. Therefore, 
the Russia’s withdrawal from ECHR will have a substantial negative effect 
on the human rights protection in Russia. 
In conclusion, the domestic level implications of the withdrawal will 
be significant. Due to the complexity of the issue, it is hard to name all the 
factors that affect the outcome. In the case of UK, the essential factor is its 
international commitments, namely, the fact that it has not consented to the 
individual complaint mechanism under ICCPR. On the other hand, the main 
factor for Russia is a high number of human rights violations and at the same 
time, the inability of its judiciary branch to redress the violations. Lastly, 
owing to the complexity of the issue, this research cannot determine whether 
the human rights protection on the domestic level will suffer more in the UK 
or Russia.  
4.1.4 ECHR Implications 
Withdrawal of member states from the Convention will have wide-ranging 
effects on the Convention system. One of the most obvious effects of the 
withdrawal is the reduced applicability of the Convention. The Court has the 
jurisdiction only over member states to the Convention. For this reason, the 
number of member states to the Convention is proportional to the breadth of 
the capacity of the Court. Accordingly, withdrawal of each member state will 
reduce the capacity of the Court as the withdrawal will render the Court 
without the jurisdiction to rule on the withdrawing state. 
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Moreover, similar to the global implications, the impact of the 
withdrawal on the Convention system will differ depending on a particular 
withdrawing member state. This is due to the fact that states play different 
roles in the protection of human rights. 
For instance, according to Jagland, all member states expect the UK 
to set an example.134 Moreover, the UK has consistently placed pressure on 
the governments of European states to make international commitments to the 
protection of human rights.135 On the contrary, the UK’s withdrawal will set 
a bad example for the rest of the member states. As a consequence, it will 
release the UK’s pressure over other states to respect human rights. According 
to Muižnieks, 
Whereas member states of the Council of Europe are generally willing 
to subject themselves to criticism or “peer review” by other member 
states, they are less receptive to such criticism by non-member states 
[...]. If the UK does withdraw from the Council of Europe, other 
European countries will likely be far less receptive to the UK’s 
interventions on human rights related matters.136 
If the UK withdraws from the Convention, the same will very likely 
be placed on the agenda in member states such as Russia, Turkey, Hungary 
and Poland. Unfortunately, in that case, the UK will not have the platform 
any longer to pressure these states to refrain from the withdrawal. As a 
consequence, this process can resemble a domino effect which can have a 
significant negative impact on the capacity and the influence of the Court. In 
such a case, the jurisdiction of the Court will be substantially reduced, limited 
to states with leading human rights records. Therefore, the Court will become 
unable to redress human rights violations and improve the livelihood of 
individuals in the countries where it makes the most substantial positive 
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difference. At a certain point in this process, the Court can become so limited 
to the most human rights friendly states that it will be rendered nearly 
obsolete. However, even in that case, the Court can still continue to function 
- it will provide the guarantees for the human rights protection in a few states 
that will remain member to the Convention. Therefore, while the UK’s 
withdrawal poses a threat to the protection of human rights in some parts of 
the continent, the threat will not be existential to the Convention system. 
In contrast, Russia plays a substantially different role in the 
Convention. In general, other member states do not expect Russia to set an 
example. Nor does it place pressure on other states to respect human rights. 
For this reasons, the probability that the other member states will follow the 
Russia’s lead is fairly low. Perhaps, it is reasonable to allow the possibility of 
one or two member states following Russia out of the Convention. 
Nevertheless, the extent of this reaction will be essentially narrower in 
comparison with the expected impact of the UK’s withdrawal. Additionally, 
since Russia did not pressure other states to respect human rights, the Russia’s 
withdrawal will not release any other state from limitations. Therefore, the 
impact of Russia’s withdrawal on the Convention system will be so 
insignificant that it can hardly pose any threat whatsoever to it. 
In conclusion, withdrawal of member states from the Convention will 
have varying effects on the Convention system. Here, the main factor is the 
role played by the withdrawing state in the Convention system. This part of 
the research has demonstrated that the withdrawal of a leading human rights 
advocate and a founder state of the Convention in particular the UK will have 
a substantial impact on the Convention system - it can render the Convention 
and the Court nearly obsolete, but it will not pose an existential threat to it. In 
contrast, the withdrawal of a member state with a questionable human rights 
record in particular Russia will generate an insignificant impact on the 
Convention system. 
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4.2 Non-compliance with the 
Judgments 
4.2.1 International Law and the Convention 
According to the Convention, “[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to 
abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are 
parties.”137 This establishes a binding force of the Court judgments for the 
states concerned. This provision is based on the general principle of pacta 
sunt servanda (agreements must be kept)138 codified in article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as well as in the Preamble to it: 
“[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed 
by them in good faith.”  
The judgments of the Court are “essentially declaratory” by nature139 
and lack “an invalidating effect.” If a Court, in judgment, finds a violation of 
the Convention, due to the declaratory nature, state authorities are given 
discretion to determine specific measures that are necessary to implement the 
ruling.140 These measures can be individual or general, depending on the 
specificities of the violation. When a violation yields individual measures, a 
respondent state is required “to ensure that the violation has ceased and that 
the injured party is put, as far as possible, in the same situation as that party 
enjoyed prior to the violation of the Convention.” As for the case of general 
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measures, the state is to prevent “new violations similar to that or those found 
or [to] put[...] an end to continuing violations.”141 
In line with the Convention, final judgments of the Court are 
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of execution.142 
If a member state were to fail to implement the Court judgment, CM can, in 
theory, adopt measures in response to the failure.143 Nevertheless, in spite of 
the fact that there have been a number of cases where a respondent state failed 
to implement judgments, CM has never invoked the abovementioned 
capacity.  
With respect to a state party’s failure to implement a judgment, the 
Court has established that the state’s international responsibility can be 
engaged.144 Under the rules on responsibility of states, a state responsible for 
an internationally wrongful act has the obligations of cessation and non-
repetition of that act.145 The state is also required to “make full reparation for 
the injury caused”146 and “to make restitution [...] to re-establish the situation 
which existed before the wrongful act was committed.”147 
Furthermore, it has to be noted that the state’s obligation to implement 
a judgment of the Court exists with no regard to the provisions of its domestic 
law.  This is on the basis of article 27 of VCLT, which states that a “party 
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure 
to perform a treaty.”148 As a consequence, article 26 of VCLT prevails over 
any conflict between the fulfilment of a treaty obligation and internal laws of 
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the state in question.149 The notion of “internal law” refers to the domestic 
legal system in its entirety, including legislative, administrative and 
regulatory provisions as well as gaps in the legal system.150 According to 
PCIJ, it also includes states’ constitutional principles and provisions.151 
As a matter of fact, the European Commission for Democracy through 
Law (Venice Commission) issued an opinion that concerns the relationship 
between the international obligations of a state and the latter’s internal laws. 
The opinion was issued in response to the 2015 amendments to the Russian 
Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court that empowered the 
latter to declare decisions of international courts “unenforceable.”152 The 
Venice Commission emphasized that the compliance with the judgments of 
the Court “is an unequivocal, imperative legal obligation.”153 It determined 
that the provisions of the Russian law in question were “in direct conflict with 
the obligations” under ECHR and VCLT.154 According to the Commission, 
non-compliance with the Court judgments were out of the question. It 
concluded that in the case where the enforcement is impossible under the 
Constitution, there is only one option left for the state in question - to amend 
its constitution.155 
Accordingly, generally, the refusal to implement a judgment of the 
Court violates the provisions of the Convention and international law. 
Nevertheless, the following two paragraphs will apply the abovementioned 
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principles to assess the legality of the UK’s and Russia’s failure to implement 
the judgments. 
On the one hand, the UK has not implemented judgments in Hirst (No. 
2), Greens and M.T., Firth and Others, McHugh and Others and Millbank 
and Others, for political reasons. The UK government is disagreeing with the 
Court in these judgments. Moreover, a bill that was intended to bring the UK 
legislation in line with the Convention was not successful. The failure to fulfil 
obligations under the Convention cannot be excused for these reasons. 
Accordingly, in failing to implement the judgments, the UK is violating the 
Convention and international law. 
On the other hand, Russia has not implemented Court judgments in 
Anchugov and Gladkov and OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos on the 
ground that the Russian Constitutional Court declared the judgments to be in 
contradiction with the Russian Constitution and deemed them unenforceable. 
Under the applicable rules of international law states are not allowed to 
invoke provisions of internal laws, including constitutions, as justification for 
their failure to perform treaties. Therefore, we can conclude that the Russia’s 
failure to implement the Court judgments is in violation of international law 
and the Convention. 
4.2.2 Global Implications 
When it comes to global implications of non-compliance with judgments of 
the Court, a former Attorney General of the UK Dominic Grieve stated that 
the “reputational consequences” of non-compliance will be “a very serious 
consideration.” This is due to the fact that it will be a major departure from 
the UK’s attitude towards its international commitments and human rights.156 
For this reason, the non-compliance will damage the credibility and 
reputation of the UK with respect to human rights. This, as a consequence, 
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will be a hurdle in lobbying for the new developments or for the maintenance 
of a status quo in the field of human rights anywhere in the world. 
A clear example of reputational consequences that have realized 
recently was triggered by the UK’s Prime Minister's mere political 
statements.157 In 2014, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, when addressing 
the national assembly and the senate regarding the charges against him 
brought by the International Criminal Court, cited David Cameron’s skeptical 
stance towards ECtHR.158 
On the contrary, implications of the non-compliance by Russia will be 
different. This is due to the fact that unlike the UK, Russia has a negative 
human rights record. It already lacks a good reputation and a high degree of 
credibility in the human rights field. Most likely, the Russia’s refusal to 
implement the Court judgments will not come as a surprise to other states. 
For this reason, the global consequences of its non-compliance with the 
judgments will not be substantial. 
In conclusion, the non-compliance with the Court judgments will have 
varying effects on the human rights protection on the global scale. Essentially, 
it depends on a particular state that is failing to comply with the judgments. 
Non-compliance by a leading human rights advocate and a founder state of 
the Convention, the UK, will have a noticeable impact on the protection of 
human rights on the global scale. On the contrary, the non-compliance by a 
state with a negative human rights record, Russia, will not generate a 
significant impact. 
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4.2.3 Domestic Implications 
Domestic implications of noncompliance of a member state with the Court 
judgments are directly related to the judgments in question. The implications 
will vary per judgment. In the circumstances, where a violation yields 
individual measures, for instance, in OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos, the 
non-compliance will have the largest impact on the applicants in the case. On 
the contrary, in the case of general measures, as it is in the judgments 
concerning the prisoners’ voting rights, the non-compliance will impact the 
interests of a larger community, in this case, all prisoners of the state in 
question belonging to the group that in accordance with the Convention, must 
have the right to free elections. 
Additionally, it has to be taken into account that the non-compliance 
with the Court judgments will put a dent in its binding force. It will set a 
precedent that a state, against the provision of international law, is allowed to 
refrain from implementing a judgment of the Court for any particular reason. 
Such will negatively influence a general situation of the human rights 
protection in the non-complying state. Muižnieks emphasized that it will 
weaken “the safeguards for individuals and companies against possible state 
abuses.”159 
4.2.4 ECHR Implications 
The binding force of the Court judgments has played one of the key elements 
in the success of the CoE system. It is due to the binding nature that 
governments have to protect human rights and redress violations. This 
obligation applies without any regard to the willingness of the concerned 
governments. However, the non-compliance with the Court judgments 
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directly contradicts with this imperative legal obligation under the 
Convention and international law. Many have spoken out that for that reason, 
the non-compliance will pose existential threats to the Convention system and 
consequently, it will jeopardise the human rights protection in Europe. For 
example, Muižnieks stated that the non-compliance “threatens the very 
integrity and legitimacy of the system of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.”160 He draws such a drastic conclusion owing to the message that the 
non-compliance will send. According to him, it will set a dangerous precedent 
that the member states can willingly refuse the standards of democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law required by CoE.161 He concludes that since 
the non-compliance poses existential threats to the system, the member states 
should withdraw from the Convention instead of defying the Court by 
refusing to implement its judgments.162 
In discussions on the UK’s non-compliance, its leading role in the 
consistent support for the positive human rights developments is always 
emphasized. According to Jagland, the UK has a powerful platform as “the 
best pupil in class.” This position gives the UK lead over other member states. 
Any example, be it good or bad, will have a significant influence in the CoE 
system. In fact, the non-compliance with the binding Court judgments, 
without any doubt, will be a bad example. For this reason, he fears that the 
UK will cause a serious reaction in the system - “Many others will say, ‘If the 
United Kingdom is doing that, we can also do it.’” According to him, it “may 
be … the beginning of the weakening of the Convention system and probably 
after a while there may also be dissolution of the whole system.”163  
Muižnieks expressed a similar view, stating that if the UK, as one of 
the founders of CoE and leading states in the human rights protection “decides 
to “cherry-pick” and selectively implement judgments, other states will 
                                                 
160 ibid. 
161 ibid. 
162 Nils Muižnieks (n 62). 
163 Joint Committee of House of Lords and House of Commons (n 63) para 109. 
 54 
invariably follow suit and the system will unravel very quickly.” He noted 
that, in his opinion, as of October 2013, the UK’s refusal to implement the 
“Hirst (No. 2) and Greens and M.T judgments has thus far not caused 
irreparable damage to the Court, the Council of Europe, or the UK’s 
international reputation.” According to him, the impact is just a matter of time 
and if the UK continued to refuse the implementation of the judgments, other 
member states “would probably follow the UK’s lead and also claim that 
compliance with certain judgments is not possible, necessary or 
expedient.”164 Muižnieks deems such scenario as “probably [...] the 
beginning of the end of the ECHR system.”165 
The author’s thesis supervisor, Göran Melander is sceptical of the idea 
that the UK’s non-compliance with the judgments will constitute the 
beginning of the end of the ECHR system. He deems such rhetoric somewhat 
exaggerated. In his opinion, the Court will adapt to the new circumstances 
and overcome challenges.166 
Unlike the case of UK, the response to Russia’s refusal to implement 
the Court judgments has not been so pronounced. Discussions regarding the 
importance of the Russian Constitutional Court’s rulings have been limited. 
Muižnieks has been one of the few who responded to the RCC ruling 
concerning OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos, stating that it “threatens the 
very integrity and legitimacy of the system of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.”167 Nevertheless, there was no mention of “the beginning of 
the end” in his statement. Nor has anyone else implied that Russia’s refusal 
to implement the judgments will pose an existential threat to the Convention 
system. 
The author of the research believes that this has to do with Russia’s 
role in the field of human rights protection. Russia does not have a leading 
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role in the field, and any acts that have an adverse impact on human rights 
will be nearly isolated to Russia. This applies to the rulings of the Russian 
Constitutional Court. 
Nevertheless, in the author’s opinion, Russia’s refusal to implement 
the Court judgments has the potential to affect the Convention system. In the 
case of non-compliance, the Committee of Ministers, under the Convention, 
has the capacity to take responsive measures.168 CM’s failure to take effective 
measures may send a strong signal to the member states, that the CoE system 
is unable to ensure the respect for human rights against the will of an 
oppressive government. Such signal will most likely damage the credibility 
and reputation of the Convention system. 
In conclusion, the non-compliance with the Court judgments have a 
potential to pose existential threats to the Convention system. Nevertheless, 
the impact depends on a particular state that refuses to implement the 
judgments. For instance, the refusal to implement a judgment by a leading 
human rights friendly state in particular the UK can mean “the beginning of 
the end.” Whereas, the impact of the non-compliance by a state with a 
questionable human rights record - Russia - will be significantly less 
important to the Convention system. 
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5 Conclusion 
For over a few years, the government of UK has been planning to withdraw 
from the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, it has also failed 
to implement binding judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Similarly, the Russian government has confirmed that the withdrawal from 
the Convention is being considered while, at the same time, it refuses to 
implement two judgments of the Court. This thesis has analysed these factual 
circumstances in light of the relevant legal norms. Subsequently, it has drawn 
conclusions on the impact that these tendencies will have on the protection of 
human rights on global, domestic and regional levels. The research has 
demonstrated that while both tendencies will have an adverse impact on 
human rights on all three levels, the impact varies significantly per state as 
well as per scenario - withdrawal and non-compliance. 
Firstly, according to the findings of the research, the impact on the 
protection of human rights on various levels is significantly different, 
depending on whether a state withdraws from the Convention or refuses to 
implement a judgment of the Court. The main reason for the difference is the 
legality of the two. On the one hand, the withdrawal is in compliance with the 
Convention and international law. It is regulated and stays within the legal 
framework of the Convention. On the contrary, the non-compliance violates 
the Convention and the applicable rules of international law. It defies the 
purpose of the Convention and of the human rights system. 
The research findings show that the impacts of withdrawal and non-
compliance are the most different on the regional level within the CoE 
system. The withdrawal from the Convention can have a significant effect on 
the Convention system. It has the potential to drastically reduce the number 
of member states to the Convention. Nevertheless, according to the findings 
of the research, a state withdrawal from the Convention does not pose an 
existential threat to the human rights system. On the contrary, the research 
shows that the non-compliance with the Court judgments can have a more 
severe impact on the system. It contradicts with the principal element of the 
 57 
establishment - the binding force of the Court judgments. For this reason, the 
non-compliance can pose an existential threat to the Convention system. 
Secondly, the findings of the research show that in either of the 
circumstances, be it withdrawal or non-compliance, the impact on the 
protection of human rights significantly differ, depending on a particular 
member state involved. The main reason for the difference is varying 
characteristics of states such as reputation and credibility in the field of human 
rights. The thesis studied the implications in connection with two member 
states, the UK and Russia. The two are substantially different with respect to 
human rights. 
The difference of impacts caused by the UK and Russia is clearly 
noticeable on the global and regional levels. In connection with the UK, the 
findings show that both the withdrawal and non-compliance, due to the 
reputational consequences, will have a significant negative impact on the 
protection of human rights on the global and regional levels. On the contrary, 
the withdrawal or non-compliance by Russia, according to the findings, will 
not generate a significant impact on the global and regional levels. 
Moreover, the findings demonstrate the complexity of the research 
topic, as they do not follow a consistent pattern. This is due to a high number 
of variables that influence the outcome, for instance, international 
commitments as well as the effectivity of domestic judicial branch. In fact, 
unlike the UK, Russia has consented to the individual complaint mechanism 
under ICCPR. On the other hand, unlike Russia, the UK’s judicial branch is 
better equipped to redress human rights violations without an oversight of an 
international human rights body. For these reasons, it is hard to determine 
whether the UK’s or Russia’s withdrawal will cause more significant adverse 
impact on the domestic level. As a matter of fact, this research does not cover 
such determination. 
There are some of the relevant issues that are not covered by this study 
and require further research. Firstly, to account the findings for the measures 
that CoE and its member states can take in response to the withdrawal and/or 
non-compliance a further research can be carried out. Secondly, this research 
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studies an ongoing process. The factual and legal circumstances of the 
research are as of 15 May 2017. For this reason, any development in the area 
can become a subject of additional research. Lastly, this research only 
analyses two states, the UK and Russia. The research can be expanded over 
other states. 
In conclusion, the research has studied current tendencies within the 
CoE and found that the protection of human rights on the global, domestic 
and regional levels will be differently affected by two intersecting factors. In 
one dimension, the impact depends on whether a state is withdrawing from 
the Convention or refusing to comply with the judgment of the Court. In the 
other dimension, the impact varies depending on the characteristics of a 
particular state involved. The author believes that the research and its findings 
are important to the field of international human rights law as they continue 
the academic discussion on the contemporary challenges. The research 
contributes to the better understanding of the wide-ranging implications of 
the measures that states can take within the European human rights system. 
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